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Note
Mergers & Accusations: Chinese Auditing
and Corporate Disclosure Standards
Indirectly on Trial in the United States
Janelle A. McCarty*
In 2011, U.S. courts experienced a sudden rise in class
action litigation from shareholders of U.S.–listed Chinese
companies, primarily claiming violations of disclosure duties
emanating from false information regarding finances and
1
operations in China. These Chinese companies entered the
U.S. market through a reverse merger, a transaction where a
2
primary company merges with a listed U.S. shell company.
This is a relatively inexpensive and fast method of entering the
U.S. public markets. Chinese companies are not the only
companies that utilize this transaction to enter the public
market, but they are the only group that has shareholders
turning to the courts with claims of fraud, consistently in the
3
reverse merger context. These Chinese reverse mergers
(“CRMs”) accounted for 25.5% of all class action filings in the

*J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School, Concentration in
Business Law; B.S. 2008, University of Nevada-Reno. The author thanks the
editors and staff of the MJIL for their dedication and assistance improving
this article. She also thanks her husband, Dr. Matthew M. McCarty, for his
support and comments on numerous drafts.
1. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS
2011 MID-YEAR ASSESSMENT 1, 13 (2011).
2. See generally Gariel Nahoum, Small Cap Companies and the Diamond
in the Rough Theory: Dispelling the IPO Myth and Following the Regulation A
and Reverse Merger Examples, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1865, 1902–09 (2007)
(describing the reverse merger transaction).
3. Compare Helen Luk, Sneaking In Through the Back Door, THE HONG
KONG INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS (May 14, 2011),
http://app1.hkicpa.org.hk/APLUS/1105/pdf/mergers.pdf,
with
Henning
Mennenoeh, Peter Kohl & Wolfgang Kircher, Reverse Mergers Between
German and US Biotech Companies, 8 BIO-SCIENCE L. REV. 131, 131 (2006)
(discussing the use of reverse mergers by German biotech companies without
any mention of fraud).
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4

first six months of 2011, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) has since issued an investor warning
5
bulletin advising people against investing in these companies.
U.S.–listed Chinese companies bring with them financial
information for disclosure from operations in China, raising an
array of accounting and auditing difficulties for auditors in the
United States, and often fraudulent information is able to pass
undetected. Shareholders need to be able to rely on accurate
corporate disclosures in order to make decisions based on the
6
actual market price of publicly traded shares. If shareholders
are not able to rely on that information, the foundation of the
U.S. securities market is harmed. Currently the only solution
available for injured shareholders is litigation: a very
constrained ex post solution that is not likely to result in
7
suitable remedies for shareholders. Given the rise in CRM
8
transactions and the continuing economic relationship
between China and the United States it seems likely that there
will continue to be an increase in CRMs involving shell
companies. Therefore, preventative action needs to be created
to address this type of fraud before it enters the market.
In order to maintain the integrity of the U.S. securities
market there needs to be an ex ante solution and infrastructure
in place to properly review the information provided by the
Chinese company upon merger with a U.S. shell. Such a
solution will involve cooperation between the Chinese and
American executive or judicial systems.
No concrete recommendations for an ex ante solution have
been suggested. While reverse mergers are not treated the
same as classical mergers when it comes to competition law, a
bilateral agreement between China and the United States
could utilize China’s recent competition laws as a foundation
4. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 1.
5. See SEC Off. of Investor Educ. & Advoc., Investor Bulletin: Reverse
Mergers
4
(2011),
http://www.investor.gov/sites/default/files/ReverseMergers.pdf.
6. See Christian J. Meier-Schatz, Objectives of Financial Disclosure
Regulation, 8 J. COMP. BUS. & CAP. MARKET L. 219 (1986) (stating that the
traditional purposes of financial corporate disclosure are investor protection,
market efficiency and corporate governance, with other broad public policy
considerations).
7. See, e.g., Luk, supra note 3, at 18.
8. See Research Note, PCAOB, Activity Summary and Audit
Implications for Reverse Mergers Involving Companies from the China
Region: June 1, 2007 to March 31, 2010, 2 (Mar. 14, 2011),
http://pcaobus.org/Research/Documents/Chinese_Reverse_Merger_Research_N
ote.pdf.
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for further regulation. China’s competition laws currently
contain regulations involving a thorough review of merging
9
companies. Yet while competition laws in the United States
and China converge, accounting and audit regimes between the
10
two countries remain divergent in practice. A bilateral
agreement should be written to establish procedures necessary
to ensure accurate information is conveyed to the U.S. market.
While this solution combines different areas of law, and plays
with novel concepts mixed with commonly considered
international legal improvements, it raises interesting methods
of solving a problem that is currently without adequate remedy.
Part I of this note will introduce the reverse merger
transaction, discuss how it has been problematic for the SEC
and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”) to
regulate, and examine the use of international agreements as a
vehicle for a solution to the fundamental auditing problem in
CRM transactions. Part II will analyze why the SEC and the
CSRC are unable to sufficiently administer a solution to the
CRM problem, as well as why international investment treaties
are not likely to succeed. Part III will recommend that the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) enact an international
competition law, followed by a bilateral agreement between
China and the United States directly targeting the root of the
problem: Chinese auditing and corporate disclosure standards.
I. CRMS, FRAUD, AND THE ROLE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Reverse mergers are a useful tool for firms wishing to enter
the public market; however, increasingly these transactions are
looked at with suspicion based on fraudulent accounting
11
concerns. The SEC has tried, unsuccessfully, to combat this,
leaving shareholders in the United States with few options.
12
These transactions oftentimes escape review in China as well.
Even when audited, these transactions remain suspect based
on the quality and poor enforcement of the regulations
13
currently in force in China. Domestic initiatives alone seem
9. See OWEN NEE & JINGZHOU TAO, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS:
BUSINESS LAWS OF CHINA 90–91 (2010).
10. See, e.g., Research Note, supra note 8 at 6–8 (reporting that there has
been 159 CRMs from January 1, 2007 to March 31, 2010 with capitalization of
$12.8B).
11. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 1.
12. See Jay Zhe Zhang, Securities Markets and Securities Regulation in
China, 22 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 557, 560 (1996–1997).
13. See id. at 561–63.
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insufficient, thus international forums and the use of
international agreements are examined, specifically in the area
of competition law, as this may be the best place to turn for a
solution.
A. CRM INTERACTION WITH THE U.S. MARKET
Chinese private firms looking to go public have global
market options, including mainland markets, Hong Kong, and
14
Europe, but many choose to enter U.S. equity markets due to
15
the size and stability of these markets.
There are two options for companies seeking to enter U.S.
public markets: an initial public offering (“IPO”) or a reverse
16
17
merger. An IPO is a very time consuming and costly process.
IPOs have decreased as investors are reluctant to purchase IPO
stock, and companies are deterred by the high cost of not only
entering the market but also paying ongoing regulatory
18
compliance costs. A reverse merger, on the other hand, is a
cheaper and faster method of entering the public market
19
through the back door. A reverse merger, also known as a
reverse takeover, is not an illegal transaction nor is it
20
inherently problematic.
The transaction involves the
shareholders of a privately held company acquiring a shell
company already listed on a public exchange through the
21
purchase of a majority of the publicly traded shares. In most
cases, the shell company had previously liquidated its assets
22
and had no real value other than outstanding securities. The
shell shareholders’ share values become determined by the
14. See Erica Fung, Regulatory Competition in International Capital
Markets: Evidence From China in 2004-2005, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 243, 250–
52 (2006) (explaining that Chinese domestic markets are not very desirable
because market forces cannot operate freely in China as the legal framework
preserves an inefficient top-down management structure).
15. See 11A SIMON M. LORNE, ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS § 3:11.10
(2011) (stating that companies can raise a lot of money in the United States
partly because of the reliable and stable market system and also noting that
many Chinese companies are specifically attracted to the NASDAQ because of
its valuations of internet and technology companies).
16. See Leslie A. Gordon, Red-Flagging China: Regulators Eye Chinese
Companies Using Reverse Mergers to Enter US, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2011, at 17.
17. See Luk, supra note 3.
18. See Dale A. Oesterle, The High Cost of IPOs Depresses Venture Capital
in the United States, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 369, 370 (2007).
19. See Luk, supra note 3.
20. See LORNE, supra note 15, § 8:11.50; Gordon, supra note 16, at 18.
21. See LORNE, supra note 15.
22. See Aden R. Pavkov, Ghouls and Godsends? A Critique of “Reverse
Merger” Policy, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 475, 478 (2006).
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23

private entity’s activities. The merged private company, in
effect, is therefore already registered with the SEC, bypassing
the need for the private company to go public yet providing the
24
company access to equity markets. In essence, the private
company becomes the SEC reporting entity with access to U.S.
capital markets, and must file audited financial statements
with the SEC as well as have an audit performed by a
25
registered accounting firm. This results in substantially all
company operations residing in China with securities traded in
26
the United States through the shell. The merged companies
are subject to audits and must provide financial statements,
but there is increased consternation over the significant
accounting deficiencies that raise concerns of whether some of
27
these transactions are vessels for securities fraud.
A reverse merger offers two advantages over an IPO: it can
be completed both more quickly and less expensively, allowing
28
firms with less capital to gain access to public markets.
Reverse mergers are not uncommon in corporate transactions
in the United States, but the SEC and stock markets are
suspicious of companies who choose to enter the U.S. public
market through this route (rather than as an IPO) as there are
fewer filing requirements and more room for fraudulent
29
information to enter the capital markets. Potential drawbacks
in opting for a reverse merger over an IPO are the high costs of
due diligence in selecting a shell company, problems getting
30
free-trading stock, and dealing with other regulatory hurdles.
Nevertheless, the IPO process is still regarded as more time
consuming and expensive, making the U.S. market less
23. See id.
24. See LORNE, supra note 15, § 3:11.10; see also id.
25. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, INVESTIGATIONS AND LITIGATION
RELATED TO CHINESE REVERSE MERGER COMPANIES 2 (2011).
26. See LORNE, supra note 15, § 3:11.10 (explaining that securities fraud
occurs when the operations of a U.S.–listed Chinese company are almost
entirely in China, but the U.S. auditors are unable to catch the accounting
deficiencies or fraud).
27. See id.
28. See Nahoum, supra note 2, at 1903–04 (establishing that the mean
duration of a reverse merger is only ninety-two days compared to 287 days for
an IPO, and the average assets of firms that do a reverse merger are only
$2.19M as compared to $41.72M for firms that go through an IPO).
29. See LORNE, supra note 15, § 3:11.10.
30. See Nahoum, supra note 2, at 1904–05 (referencing the argument
raised by critics of CRM transactions, claiming that the private company has
to discover if the public shell shares are held by bona fide stockholders or if
they are controlled by a stock promoter who is simply trying to sell the stock to
increase the price, which can lead to artificially inflated share prices).
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attractive than other world markets to Chinese companies:
According to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(“PCAOB”), from 2007 to 2010, only 56 Chinese companies
entered the U.S. market through IPOs as opposed to 159
32
CRMs.
Reverse mergers can be done with any foreign company,
but Chinese and German companies predominately utilize the
33
transaction within the United States. German biotechnology
firms come to the United States to access liquid markets with a
well-established regulatory framework due to difficulties
34
raising capital in Germany. Chinese firms purport to have the
35
same aim. Unlike an IPO, there is only one requirement for
firms seeking access to U.S. markets through a reverse
36
merger. In 2005, the SEC adopted new rules governing
37
reverse mergers in an effort to protect investors from fraud.
These regulations require the surviving entity to file an
amended, more detailed Form 8-K within four business days of
38
the transaction. This disclosure is a comprehensive summary
of the corporation substantively similar to a Form 10
registration statement, which is required for the registration of
39
securities under Section 12 of the Exchange Act. This is an
enhancement of the previous disclosure requirements on old
Form 8-K that allowed for a seventy-one day window in which
40
to file the Form. The new four-day filing requirement
31. See Fung, supra note 14, at 245 (pointing out that Chinese issuers
who do not want to deal with IPO and SEC burdens in the United States look
to viable alternatives in Hong Kong and London); see also Paul Gillis, Why
Audit a U.S. listed Chinese Company?, CHINA ACCT. BLOG (Aug. 31, 2011, 2:38
PM),
http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/why-audit-a-us-listedchine.html (stating that the average fee for auditing a Chinese company was
close to $3M for those listed on NYSE and $637,000 for those on the NASDAQ,
meaning most smaller firms that come to the U.S. market do so through
reverse mergers).
32. See Research Note, supra note 8, at 1.
33. See Nahoum, supra note 2, at 1907.
34. See Mennenoeh et al., supra note 3, at 131 (discussing the benefits for
German firms to accessing U.S. markets through reverse mergers).
35. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 25, at 1.
36. See SEC Off. of Investor Educ. & Advoc., supra note 5, at 1.
37. See Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Companies,
70 Fed. Reg. 42234 (Jul. 21, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239,
240, 249).
38. See LORNE, supra note 15, § 8:1; see also 17 C.F.R. 249.380 (2011).
39. See LORNE, supra note 15, § 8:1.
40. Compare SEC, Form 10, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10.pdf
(last
visited
Oct.
17,
2011),
with
SEC,
Form
8-K,
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2011), and
SEC, Form S-8, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forms-8.pdf (last visited Oct.
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essentially requires that all merger consequences be
41
contemplated in advance by the acquiring company. The new
regulations also require audited financial information as part of
42
the Form 8-K disclosure. Of the 159 CRMs that occurred in
2007 to 2010, 74% were audited by U.S. accounting firms and
43
the remaining 24% by Chinese firms.
Concerns raised by the SEC and shareholders have come
from inquiries into the sufficiency of the audits performed by
U.S. accounting firms of the Chinese companies. The PCAOB, a
Congressionally-established non-profit auditing organization
under SEC authority, undertakes to “oversee the audits of
public companies in order to protect investors and the public
interest by promoting informative, accurate, and independent
44
audit reports.” The PCAOB reported that there has been an
45
increase in CRMs which have almost all of their operations in
China, but use U.S. accounting firms to perform the required
46
audits. The PCAOB discovered that many of these accounting
firms are not performing audits properly due to language
barriers and a lack of understanding of domestic Chinese
47
business practices, among other issues. As a result, the
auditors cannot provide an audit with a reasonable
48
understanding of the company’s financial statements. In
many ways, U.S. auditing firms are at a disadvantage in
performing due diligence functions. They may lack the
resources to obtain correct information from the company in
China; the use of outside consulting firms to interpret the
language and data without a reasonable basis for relying on
17, 2011). Form 10 requires information on risk factors, financial information,
and securities ownership of certain beneficial owners and management, among
other things. Form S-8 cannot be used for a shell company unless the company
has transformed from a shell and files a current Form 10. It is insufficient to
simply provide the SEC with a complete Form S-8.
41. See also LUSONG ZHANG, REGULATION OF FOREIGN MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS INVOLVING COMPANIES LISTED IN CHINA 173 (2007) (stating
that the Chinese purchasing company is required to make full disclosure
concerning its business affairs and financial condition to the seller as part of
the merger process, as required by the Exchange Act).
42. See Research Note, supra note 8, at 6 (acknowledging that auditors
must be registered with the PCAOB).
43. See id. The remaining two percent were Canadian auditing firms.
44. See PCAOB, http://pcaobus.org/About/Pages/default.aspx (last visited
Oct. 17, 2011).
45. See Research Note, supra note 8, at 1.
46. See id.; see also CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 25.
47. See Research Note, supra note 8, at 8; CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,
supra note 1, at 3.
48. See Research Note, supra note 8, at 8.
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those consultants’ opinions aggravate the perceived regulatory
49
weaknesses of this transaction.
As a result of these auditing difficulties, the SEC reacts
with hostility towards CRMs because the transactions
50
involving shell companies are susceptible to fraud. The same
51
propensity for fraud has yet to be completely addressed even
with increased regulation by U.S. authorities. As SEC
Commissioner Luis Aguilar notes, some CRMs are “proving to
have significant accounting deficiencies or being [used as]
52
vessels for outright fraud.”
B. CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS AGAINST CRMS
Shareholders who have experienced a loss due to false
disclosures and possible fraud have turned to the U.S. judicial
system for recovery, but many of the defendant CRM
53
companies deny the allegations against them. Shareholders
have brought thirty-three securities class action lawsuits
alleging various violations, and seven of those CRMs have
54
joined investment banks as co-defendants. Between January
1, 2011 and June 30, 2011, CRMs and Chinese mergers and
acquisitions litigation represented 47.9% of class action filing
55
activity, up from 32.7% in the last six months of 2010. The
PCAOB has pointed to a lack of proper audits by U.S. auditing
49. See id.
50. See LORNE, supra note 15, § 8:1 (noting that the SEC is weary of
reverse mergers with shell companies because it is common for the postreverse merger shell company to fail or become marginally public companies,
and stock fraud is more common in reverse merger and shell companies than
in other public companies; the SEC prefers to see companies enter the public
market through IPOs because it tends to filter out companies that either won’t
succeed in the public market or firms that have faulty financial statements).
51. See Nahoum, supra note 2, at 1905 (referencing reverse merger fraud
that took place in 1970–80s involving shell companies that had the sole
purpose of raising money from public investors and removing the money from
the corporation for their own benefit).
52. Sarah N. Lynch, UPDATE 1 — SEC Probing Fraud at US-Listed
(Apr.
4
2011,
3:15
PM),
Foreign
Companies,
REUTERS
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/04/sec-aguilaridUSN0427084520110404; accord CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 25
(showing the concern that companies provided auditors with fraudulent
information).
53. See David Feldman, China: Boon for Litigators in 2011, REVERSE
MERGER BLOG (Aug. 26, 2011, 4:08 PM), http://www.reversemergerblog.com.
54. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 25, at 3.
55. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 1; see also
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS — 2011 MIDYEAR ASSESSMENT, http://www.cornerstone.com/securities-filings-mid-year2011/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
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firms performed for CRM companies as a possible cause of
56
problems. Subsequently, the SEC has started to target CRM
57
company auditors. This reaction could explain why the
Bloomberg Chinese Reverse Merger Index has reported a 44%
58
decrease in the value of CRMs in the first six months of 2011.
C. CHINESE SECURITIES REGULATION
The CSRC is a relatively new organization and serves a
similar purpose as the SEC does in the United States.
Securities regulation in China began in the early 1990s. An
early attempt, the Regulations Regarding the Issuance and
Trading of Stock, was enacted to develop China’s socialist
59
market economy. The fledgling market, however, quickly
proved to be susceptible to fraud through manipulation and
60
falsified records. In response, the State Council Securities
Commission (“SCSC”) was developed to regulate certain types
61
of exchanges and was administered by the CSRC. The SCSC
and CSRC merged into the current CSRC, which drafts laws
and regulations, develops policy, and monitors the securities
62
market and related agencies. Within the legal framework of
Chinese securities laws provided through the CSRC, there are
63
also “soft rules” that guide activity in securities transactions.
These “soft rules” are rules promulgated by the stock exchanges
64
themselves, allowing for some form of self-regulation. The
Securities Association of China also contributes to the
regulatory system by setting industry standards, training
securities professionals, and mediating disputes between
65
members and the CSRC.
Shareholders are also empowered to enforce regulations. In
2002, the Supreme People’s Court held that shareholders can
56. See Research Note, supra note 8, at 7–8.
57. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 13.
58. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 13.
59. See 2 JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE
FOR FOREIGN-INVESTED ENTERPRISES 758 (3d ed. 2010).
60. See id. at 756.
61. See id. at 759.
62. See id.
63. See Shin-yi Peng, The WTO Legalistic Approach and East Asia: From
the Legal Culture Perspective, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 13, 11, 19–21 (2000)
(noting the general Chinese preference for ambiguous and informal dispute
resolution mechanisms and regulations).
64. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 59, at 757 (discussing regulations issued
by the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges).
65. E.g. id. at 762.
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sue a company in a lower court if they believe that the company
66
has disclosed false information. Shareholders are permitted to
bring suit individually, or together, but they cannot bring a
67
class action lawsuit.
China acts in cooperation with other securities regulatory
bodies on an international level. China is a member of the
International
Organization
of
Securities
Commission
(“IOSCO”), a non-profit institution that aids in the transfer of
68
expertise between developing and developed countries. While
IOSCO has uniform regulatory rules, the rules are non-binding
69
on members. Nevertheless, China’s membership in this
international
organization
has
helped
increase
the
standardization of Chinese securities regulations through
Memoranda of Understanding with foreign securities
70
regulatory bodies. China is also a member of the International
Accounting Standards Committee (“IASC”) which has helped
develop a uniform standard of accounting endorsed by China’s
71
Ministry of Finance. Cooperation with these bodies has helped
shape the Chinese securities regulatory system and the
practices of the CSRC, but the system is not without
72
discrepancies that leave room for fraud.
Within China, the CSRC supervises all public offerings.
73
Only LLCs are approved by the CSRC to issue shares. The
application to go public requires reports from underwriters and
auditors, all of whom may be held jointly and severally liable in
74
the case of incomplete or false disclosures. The underwriter is
a securities firm that sells the shares to investors on behalf of
the company, as Chinese companies in China cannot sell
75
directly to investors. A company’s underwriter works to
76
ensure proper disclosure compliance. The underwriter must
take corrective action if it finds false information contained in
the company’s prospectus and must also ensure that post-

66. See id. at 818–19.
67. See id. at 819.
68. See JANE FU, CORPORATE DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
IN CHINA 206 (2010).
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 207.
72. See id. at 209.
73. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 59, at 773.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 776.
76. See id. at 773–74.
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77

offering internal controls are effective. The CSRC also
78
supervises the issuance of Chinese company stock abroad.
Chinese companies must submit an application to the CSRC,
which includes financial and operational information, in order
79
to seek approval for foreign share issuance.
Chinese securities laws are based on basic principles of
investor protection, increasing transparency and fairness, and
80
working within a highly regulated industry. Unsurprisingly,
81
fraud is a prohibited trading activity. Entities involved in
securities trading are forbidden from making “false or
misleading statements or omissions concerning information
that is material to the sale of stock” as well as from “forging,
altering or destroying operational records or accounting books
of the company in order to affect the issuance or trading of the
82
company’s stock.” Similarly, it is a criminal offense to
83
manipulate share prices by providing false information.
In order to enforce such principles, Chinese corporations
must keep detailed financial and administrative records of the
84
company. Not surprisingly, corporations are not eager to meet
these requirements and China has not yet cultivated an
85
environment conducive to disclosure. Chinese corporations
86
must submit midterm and annual reports to the CSRC,
resembling the SEC requirements of Forms 10-Q and 10-K. At
the end of a fiscal year, companies must provide a financial
report that is to be audited by an auditing firm nominated by
87
the shareholders or board. Corporations must provide all
necessary and requested information to the auditors, and is
88
also expressly forbidden from providing false information. If
77.
78.
79.
80.

See id. at 774, 777.
See Id. at 793.
See id.
See 2 GAO LINGYUN & JIA XILING, SERIES ON CONTEMPORARY
CHINESE LAW: CHINESE BUSINESS LAW 273 (Charles Wellford & Robert L.
Jacobson eds., 2008).
81. See id. at 310.
82. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 59, at 790–91.
83. See id. at 1041.
84. See id. at 766 (stating that corporations must keep minutes of
meetings, financial and accounting records, and the articles of association
must include a number of listed items).
85. See FU, supra note 68, at 210–11. Compliance is seen as a burden and
many companies only provide minimal information. Companies also avoid
disclosure if it will hurt their share price.
86. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 59, at 784.
87. See LINGYUN & XILING, supra note 80, at 57–58.
88. See id. at 58.

358

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol 21:2

the corporation experiences a material change or major event
that could have a significant impact on the market value of its
shares, it must file a report with the relevant stock exchange
89
and the CSRC. Further, there are additional strict procedures
for mergers and other capital changes, as corporations are
required to notify creditors and make a public announcement
90
within thirty days of completing such a transaction.
Disclosure exemptions, however, can be granted by the stock
exchanges if the disclosure will damage the company’s
91
interest.
Yet even with the thorough regulatory framework,
securities fraud in the form of false financial or operational
92
information is still a problem. Beginning in the mid-1990s a
CRM firm, Sino-Forest, orchestrated a $4 billion dollar Ponzi
93
scheme by fabricating information on its forestry operations.
Canadian and U.S. regulators and investors failed to realize
Sino-Forest’s operations claimed to be far in excess even of
94
what Chinese logging regulations allowed. By providing
auditors with only 0.3% of company information (claiming the
95
rest was competitive information)
and obscuring the
company’s structure with numerous subsidiaries, Sino-Forest
defrauded investors for more than fifteen years. Due to both
the company’s manipulations and the difficulty of verifying its
information and assets, auditors were unable or unwilling to
96
identify the basis for securities fraud.
In 2002 a CSRC-conducted survey showed that at least one
97
in ten publicly listed companies doctored its books. As a
result, the securities laws were revised in 2005 for the
protection of Chinese investors, allowing the government an
increased ability to intervene, pushing for greater disclosure
requirements, and increasing the penalties for securities

89. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 59, at 785; cf. SEC, supra note 40.
90. See LINGYUN & XILING, supra note 80, at 54.
91. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 59, at 785.
92. E.g. Fung, supra note 14, at 253; FU, supra note 68, at 211 (finding
that the high capital requirements for an IPO in China force some companies
to decide to provide false information on profits).
93. See Carson C. Block, Muddy Waters Research, (June 2, 2011)
http://www.muddywatersresearch.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/06/MW_TRE_060211.pdf.
94. See id. at 14.
95. See id. at 2.
96. See id. at 1.
97. See Fung, supra note 14, at 253.
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violations. It remains doubtful whether these additional
regulatory attempts will prove more resilient against such
widespread tampering of financial statements.
A more comprehensive method of dealing with the
inadequacies posed by Chinese domestic regulations would be
to resort to common tools utilized in international law. While
no standing bilateral or multilateral treaty addresses
fraudulent reverse merger transactions, a treaty-based solution
is the best way to halt the fraudulent CRM trend. In addition to
tackling this specific type of transaction, a broad based
securities and accounting treaty would be invaluable in shining
greater light on international merger issues generally.
D. ADDRESSING CRMS THROUGH COMPETITION LAW
Competition law, also referred to as antitrust law, aims to
enhance market competition by regulating anti-competitive
99
behavior. Competition laws, generally speaking, prohibit
domestic anti-competitive conduct through substantive limits
on business operations, procedural requirements of disclosure
and auditing, or both. Developing as well as developed
countries, however, are increasingly examining the scope of
100
competition laws.
Competition law generally encompasses
regulations on mergers, anti-monopoly laws, and concerted
101
conduct laws.
Merger control laws were first enacted in China to address
anti-competitive abuses by foreign corporations and
102
investors.
As the Chinese market moved away from a
government-planned economy, regulators sought to moderate
the transition by enacting measures designed to combat anti103
competitive practices. These new laws, modeled after laws in
104
the United States and the European Union, focused China’s
efforts generally on preventing harm to Chinese consumers and

98. See LINGYUN & XILING, supra note 80, at 271, 273.
99. See MARTYN TAYLOR, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW: A NEW
DIMENSION FOR THE WTO? 1 (2006).
100. See MAHER M. DABBAH, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
COMPETITION LAW 1 (Maher M. Dabbah & Barry Hawk eds., 2010). Crossborder influence of domestic competition laws is not necessarily bilateral, but
extends beyond that as some countries are actually using the competition laws
of another as the model rules in their jurisdictions. See id. at 5.
101. See id. at 32-36.
102. See id. at 99.
103. See id. at 97.
104. See NEE & TAO, supra note 9, at 324.
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specifically in controlling mergers and acquisitions.
Unfortunately, the usefulness of these regulations remains
106
doubtful due to the spotty enforcement record. Because of
China’s emphasis on the merger transaction, the harm created
by the CRM trend is beyond the scope of those regulations.
While Chinese consumers may share in some of the harm of a
fraudulent CRM, foreign investors also share exposure.
Whether there should be an international competition law
107
is a hotly debated topic. Almost all competition laws have the
108
broad purpose of serving economic, social, and political needs.
Competition laws do this through the promotion of trade and
enhanced economic liberalization through privatization,
109
helping to develop a market economy. Fraudulent financial
reports by publicly traded companies have an anti-competitive
effect on the market by negatively impacting consumer
110
welfare. A bilateral or multilateral treaty could succeed at
bringing international competition law into cross-border
transactions.
While international competition law does not fall under the
purview of the WTO, there is a historical connection between
111
trade laws and international competition laws. Both aim to
increase economic efficiency as well as global and national
112
welfare.
The draft charter for the International Trade
Organization (“ITO”), established following World War II, had
an ambitious goal, requiring multilateral regulations and
monitoring of international anti-competitive behavior, but this
was widely opposed and disregarded along with the Havana
105. See SEUNG CHONG, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 96 (2007).
106. See id. (noting that merger control hasn’t been a significant factor in
transactions in China).
107. See DABBAH, supra note 100, at 1–2, 30–31 (noting that the scope of
competition law has been growing and that debates on the purpose of
competition law are expected to increase in the global context, also noting that
international competition law has “give rise to serious disagreements”)
108. See id. at 39.
109. See id. at 41. These laws and goals are particularly important to
economies in transition. See id. As China has only recently opened up, it is
still new to the market economy and fits into this qualification. See id.
110. See id. Bork’s opinion is that courts should aim to maximize consumer
wealth and satisfaction, requiring courts to prioritize efficiency and decrease
harmful practices. Reporting fraud would likely be considered one of those
practices.
111. See TAYLOR, supra note 99, at 148. In 1927, the League of Nations’
World Economic Forum recognized a need for coordinated regulatory attention
at the international level to prevent anti-competitive conduct.
112. See id. at 167.
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Charter as a whole. The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (“GATT”), established in 1947, did not address the anticompetitive trade practices that had been considered in the
114
Havana Charter.
However, member nations submitted
115
initiatives to incorporate competition law into the GATT. In
1993, the Uruguay Round concluded with the formation of the
116
WTO, a modern version of the early ITO. Yet, the Uruguay
Round agreements still did not include an agreement on
117
international competition law.
What the Round did
accomplish however, was the creation of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures (“TRIMs”) which contains
a review provision that allows TRIMs to address competition
118
law at the discretion of the Council for Trade in Goods.
In 1996, the WTO’s Ministerial Conference created a
working group to look at anti-competitive behavior and
determine whether an international competition law should be
119
included in the WTO framework. The Uruguay Round did
establish a few provisions that address specific instances of
120
anti-competitive conduct,
but none address the problems
associated with fraudulent financial reporting or disclosure
requirements. Lamentably, the WTO seems to address
121
competition law strictly on an ad hoc basis.
E.CHINA’S INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
113. See id. at 150–51. Ratification of the Havana Charter officially failed
in 1950. See id. at 153.
114. See id. at 153–54. The GATT aimed to increase aggregate welfare by
reducing trade barriers and eliminating discrimination. While the Kennedy
Round (1967) and Tokyo Round (1979) increased the scope of the GATT by
adding non-tariff barriers to trade, it still did not address competition law. See
id.
115. See id. at 155.
116. See id. at 158–59.
117. See id. at 159. Member nations recognized the complex relationship
between trade law and competition law and concluded that more investigation
needed to be done on the subject.
118. See Uruguay Round Agreement: Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/18trims_e.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2011) (referring to Art. 9, also known as the
“review provision”).
119. See Clifford A. Jones & Mitsuo Matsushita, Preface to COMPETITION
POLICY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM v (Clifford A. Jones & Mitsuo
Matsushita eds., 2002) (predicting that international competition would be an
issue in the Doha Round).
120. See TAYLOR, supra note 99, at 159.
121. See id. at 163 (pointing to the fact that this highly localized approach
is inconsistent with the overall unified methods and purpose of the WTO
agreements).
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TREATIES
China became a member of the WTO in 2001 by
committing to a number of trade-liberalizing agreements.
These agreements have one effect, among others, of increasing
122
competition. This increased competition has shaped China’s
123
law on both domestic and foreign investment.
China has
shown a willingness to be a greater actor in international
investment activities by becoming a party to both bilateral and
124
multilateral treaties on the subject.
In the absence of a
relevant multilateral agreement, China has created numerous
bilateral agreements on investment promotion with countries
125
around the world.
For example, China has a bilateral
agreement with India that requires each government to
encourage investments and protect the interest of investors in
126
both countries.
To summarize, while they may be potential vehicles for
fraud, reverse mergers are likely to continue to exist, as they
are an appealing alternative as compared with IPOs for private
companies seeking to enter the public market. Unilateral action
by the SEC, CSRC, and other relevant agencies has proved
insufficient as a means of preventing fraud. Rampant
accounting and disclosure fraud and a lack of enforcement of
accounting standards within China present an international
problem, requiring a solution through international law.
II. EVALUATING SOLUTIONS TO THE CRM PROBLEM
Regardless of whether courts find fraud to be present in
the pending cases, the underlying cause of the shareholder
class action lawsuits appears to be the auditing practices of
CRMs. Auditors utilizing this faulty accounting information
127
allow the continued recycling of baseless financial reports.
Unilateral action by the SEC or other U.S. agencies is
insufficient to protect American shareholders, highlighting the
122. See LIU XIAOHONG ET AL., SERIES ON CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW:
CHINESE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 230 (Charles Wellford & Lauryn
Beer eds., 2008).
123. See id. at 129.
124. See id. at 128.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See Gordon, supra note 16; Luk, supra note 3, at 15 (“Almost three in
four Chinese reverse merger companies are audited by U.S. auditors, but as
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board highlighted in a March
report, some of these firms do not seem to be doing their job properly.”).
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need for a solution employing international law. However,
many international law options, while good in theory, are not
feasible in practice. Bilateral investment treaties are too
narrow in scope, and a multilateral agreement on investment,
while sufficiently broad in scope, is likely too politically charged
129
to gain traction in international negotiations.
Using
international competition law to mandate a standard for
accounting and auditing between China and the United States
is the optimal solution. With China increasingly focusing on
130
antitrust concerns and reviewing cross-border transactions,
transitioning the audit process to China under U.S. accounting
standards would, at a minimum, grant auditors greater access
to a company prior to its entrance into U.S. securities markets.
Coupling greater access with more stringent accounting
standards will go a long way to combating the fraud potential
posed by CRMs.
A. UNILATERAL U.S. REGULATION IS INSUFFICIENT TO ADDRESS
THE CRM PROBLEM
Prior regulatory attempts to address CRM fraud merely
changed the time frame given to the company to provide the
131
SEC with audited financial information. The 2005 Form 8-K
disclosure requirement did not offer incentives to reverse
mergers to provide more accurate or transparent information.
Given the nature of the reverse merger the SEC is not in a
position to provide IPO-type heightened scrutiny under the
132
Securities Act,
leaving room for the transmission of
fraudulent information. Short of converting the reverse merger
transaction into an IPO, it seems that increased SEC
regulations will not necessarily negate that transmission
potential. In any event, the negligence occurs at earlier stages
when inadequate audits are performed.
The risks and regulatory challenges posed by reverse
merger transactions leaves open the question of whether or not
this transaction should simply be eliminated. Such a
proposition is not easily attempted, however, since the SEC
128. See, e.g., Luk, supra note 3, at 15 (discussing the futility of auditing
with respect to CRMs with recent examples).
129. See KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1
(2010); CHEN HUIPING, OECD MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: A
CHINESE PERSPECTIVE 8–12 (2002).
130. See REGIONALISM, MULTILATERALISM, AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
94 (Gary P. Sampson & Stephen Woolcock eds., 2003).
131. See Pavkov, supra note 22, at 484.
132. See id.
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cannot prohibit them per se. Even if it were possible for the
SEC to do so, outlawing reverse mergers would be an overinclusive solution to the fraud perpetuated by a select number
of CRMs. Prohibiting all reverse mergers would deny investors
access to investments in “embryonic companies with high
134
growth potential” to those who are not venture capitalists. As
most small companies are high-risk and unable to attract
venture capital, investment bankers or underwriters are
unlikely to take on a costly and time consuming IPO process,
135
making the IPO track an unattractive option to raise capital.
For this type of small, but high growth potential company, a
reverse merger is a more cost effective method of reaching the
equity markets. The solution is not to restrict market entry
only to IPOs. A better solution is to gain control over the
accounting and auditing process performed by or for foreign
companies.
Both the company and the external auditor, as opposed to
just the company, should face liability for fraudulent
disclosures. Recently, the SEC has shown a willingness to
136
prosecute CRM accounting firms, embracing this principle. In
2010, the SEC investigated Moore Stephens Wurth Frazer &
Torbet LLP, a PCAOB U.S.–registered accounting firm that
137
performed audits for many CRMs. The investigation revealed
that the firm failed to perform the correct financial evaluations,
choosing instead to rely on management’s representations, even
after discovering in 2004 that the client’s internal controls
138
could not reasonably be relied upon. In many cases, however,
there is no such history of facial misrepresentation by the
133. See Dena Aubin & Andrea Shalal-Esa, INSIGHT — Where Was SEC
As Trouble Festered At Chinese Companies?, REUTERS, July 10, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/10/china-accounting-enforcementidUSN1E76905A20110710.
134. See Pavkov, supra note 22, at 489.
135. See Pavkov, supra note 22, at 489 (“Due to the economics of IPOs,
early stage companies are not generally courted by underwriters and brought
to market through the traditional process . . . . Smaller businesses simply do
not make it over the IPO hurdle.”).
136. See, e.g., Andrea Shalal-Esa & Sarah N. Lynch, Exclusive: Justice
Department Probing Chinese Accounting, REUTERS, Sept. 29, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/29/us-china-usa-accountingidUSTRE78S3QM20110929 (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (discussing Department
of Justice subpoenas of an arm of Deloitte Touche in Shanghai).
137. See Luk, supra note 3, at 18.
138. See Bob Scott, SEC Suspends California Audit Partner, THE
PROGRESSIVE
ACCT.
(Dec.
20,
2010,
11:42
PM),
http://www.theprogressiveaccountant.com/news/sec-suspends-california-auditpartner.html.
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Chinese company. Chinese companies may simply be taking
advantage of the limitations faced by U.S. auditors, and
depending on those limitations to obscure financial
140
misrepresentations.
Auditors, feeling the heat of SEC
warnings and investigations, have suggested as much. George
Qin, the head of MaloneBailey, LLP’s China audits, stated that
“it is the companies who are committing fraud,” not the
141
auditors. While it is clear in some cases that the SEC has a
case against an auditing firm, such smoking gun evidence is
the exception rather than the rule.
Shareholder lawsuits claiming violations of securities
regulations are also an ineffective solution. The class action
lawsuit brought against China North East Petroleum Holding
Ltd. (“China North”) in June 2010 was one of the first in the
142
series of cases filed against CRM companies. Shareholders
brought suit after a series of announcements made by China
143
North, during which time the share prices fluctuated. Share
prices were adversely affected when China North announced
that its previous financial statements may have been
144
incorrect. A few months later, China North issued a Form 8K that announced the company had misreported its net income
145
by almost 100%. The court granted China North’s motion to
dismiss, holding that the shareholders had opportunities to sell
without suffering a loss, meaning the loss they did suffer could
146
not be attributed to alleged misrepresentations.
This case is relevant in considering the potential for the
United States to develop a unilateral solution. The Form 8-K
was not considered by the court, because the claim failed to

139. See Luk, supra note 3, at 15.
140. As of March 2010 that firm had performed ten CRM audits, the most
of any other firm. See id. at 17.
141. See id. at 15.
142. See In re China N. E. Petroleum Holdings Sec. Litig., 2011 WL
4801516 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2011). See also Kevin LaCroix, Securities Suit
Against U.S.–Listed Chinese Company Dismissed, THE D&O DIARY (Oct. 20,
2011, 10:15 AM), http://www.dandodiary.com/2011/10/articles/securitieslitigation/securities-suit-against-uslisted-chinese-company-dismissed/.
143. See LaCroix, supra note 142.
144. See Complaint at 3, In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Sec. Litig.,
2011 WL 4801516 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2011) (No. 10-CV-04577-MGC).
145. See id. at 3–5 (stating that as earnings were actually $10.5M instead
of $19.5M, corruption was found to be likely, so the NYSE AMEX suspended
trading until September, but when trading resumed the share price fell 47%
from $9.37 to $4.42).
146. See LaCroix, supra note 142.
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survive early motions to dismiss.
Shareholders bear a
considerable burden in claiming fraud as they must meet the
heightened pleading standard required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b) and Exchange Act Rule10b-5, which requires
that the defendant knowingly or recklessly provided deceptive
148
information in connection with the purchase of securities.
Therefore, even if the SEC were to develop an elaborate set of
laws that could detect fraud before it damaged shareholders, it
would not resolve the hurdle of heightened pleading
requirements.
Even for shareholders that are able to obtain U.S.
judgments, they face substantial difficulty in recovering from
the Chinese company. The shareholders of Orient Paper, Inc.
claimed that reported revenues were substantially overstated
149
due to Orient Paper’s false disclosures of operations in China.
The 2008 Form 10-K had been audited by a disbarred auditor
and shareholders were suspicious of the CEO’s ownership of
150
seventy per cent of one of the suppliers. In July 2011, the
court found a strong inference of scienter in the alleged
conduct, dismissing the defendant’s motion for summary
151
judgment.
Despite this favorable judgment, “[t]he enforcement of
foreign judgments in China has been notoriously difficult in
152
recent years.” As these companies are based primarily in
China, with substantially all of their operations occurring in
China, the funds are not accessible by U.S. judgment without
153
the approval of a Chinese court. Though in theory the court
may grant a judgment against the parent corporation as all of
147. See In re China N. E. Petroleum Holdings Sec. Litig., 2011 WL
4801516 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2011).
148. Plaintiff-shareholders must support all allegations of securities fraud
with the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the events. Claiming a
violation under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 require at least an inference of scienter.
See In re Heckmann Corp. Sec. Litig., 2011 WL 2413999, at *8 (D. Del. June
16, 2011).
149. See Amended Complaint at 3, Henning v. Orient Paper, Inc., 2011 WL
1160486 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2011) (No. 2:10-CV-05887-VBF-AJW).
150. See id. at 5.
151. See id.
152. See Arthur Anyuan Yuan, Enforcing and Collecting Money Judgments
in China From a U.S. Judgment Creditor’s Perspective, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REV. 757, 758 (2004).
153. See Gillis, supra note 31 (stating that there is also no way to enforce
the defendant corporation to appear in court which would result in a default
judgment against them, again, with no way to be enforce the judgment); Yuan,
supra note 152.
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its board members and principal officers reside and work in
China, Chinese courts are not likely to recognize the foreign
judgment on the grounds that it is contrary to “state
154
sovereignty, security and/or public policy.”
U.S. stock exchanges do possess some power to enforce
155
compliance with securities regulations. In the case of China
North, for example, the NYSE AMEX determined that
corruption was likely involved and suspended shares from
156
trading.
However, this had the effect of damaging
shareholders who had not yet sold their shares as the share
157
when trading finally
price fell by forty-seven per cent
resumed. While suspending trade could have a deterrence
effect for companies considering filing false disclosures, it is
rather a weak post hoc solution that fails to protect
unsuspecting shareholders.
A unilateral solution devised by the United States will be
insufficient to prevent future misleading information from
entering the U.S. public market. As suggested by a senior
partner with PKF, a major auditing firm involved in CRM
audits, closer cooperation between the countries would help
158
with the audit quality.
A cross-jurisdictional solution of
cooperation between firms would enable U.S. firms to rely on
the assistance provided by Chinese firms familiar with the
area, language, and business environment, provided they have
the quality of professional standards to be PCAOB certified.
But this solution seems unlikely without a body that would
oversee and enforce the Chinese audit process.
B. UNILATERAL CHINESE REGULATION IS UNLIKELY OR
INSUFFICIENT TO ADDRESS THE CRM PROBLEM
No agency in China expressly regulates private companies
159
merging with foreign public corporations. The most efficient
solution to the CRM trend is for the CSRC, which controls the
issuance of Chinese company stock outside of China through
the Overseas Share Regulations, to formulate new regulations
154. See Yuan, supra note 152, at 767.
155. See Luk, supra note 3, at 14.
156. See Complaint at 16, In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Sec. Litig.,
2010 WL 2483602 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2010) (No. 10-CV-4577).
157. See id.
158. As of March 2010 that firm had performed ten CRM audits, the most
of any other firm. See Luk, supra note 3, at 17.
159. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 59, at 793–94 (showing that the CSRC is
limited to regulations dealing only with the issuance of Chinese companies
outside of China).
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that directly regulate CRMs. Unfortunately, this is not likely.
Currently, CRMs escape extensive review by both the SEC
and the CSRC. Normally the CSRC would oversee an
application process that reviews financial and operational
information before a company would be allowed to issue stock
161
abroad.
This type of review, however, only extends to
“regulated transactions.” Reverse mergers are not considered
regulated transactions within China’s new merger control
regime — a regime which regulates the acquisition of domestic
162
companies by foreign entities.
Regulated transactions
undergo mandatory review, with an eye to antitrust violations.
If reverse mergers were included within the regulated
transaction umbrella, the CSRC review would function as a
preliminary audit of the company’s overall position. This could
effectively prevent fraudulent information from reaching U.S.
markets. In this way, information disclosed by U.S.–listed
Chinese companies would have been audited in China in the
first instance by auditors with experience in the Chinese
business environment and proficiency in the language.
This domestic solution is not without challenges. First,
there is a glaring lack of regulatory will. Policy makers in
China actively promote foreign direct investment (“FDI”) as
opposed to foreign indirect investment (“FII”), represented by
163
reverse mergers.
In fact, reverse mergers run counter to
Chinese policies and China’s regulation of foreign
164
investment.
The failure by regulators to address this
inconsistency either by prohibiting reverse mergers or
including it as a regulated transaction is striking. It is likely
that Chinese policy makers considered the conduct of private
companies partaking in a foreign reverse merger and
subsequently decided to forego any meaningful regulation.
Second, there is no way to ensure or require Chinese
regulators to provide the quality of professional auditing or
accounting standards required by the PCAOB. It is widely
160. See id. at 793.
161. See id. The review also consists of an offering plan, prospectus, and
accounting records.
162. See CHONG, supra note 105, at 99 (describing the new merger control
regime as limited and developing in jurisprudence).
163. See NORAH GALLAGHER & WENHUA SHAN, CHINESE INVESTMENT
TREATIES 8 (Loukas Mistelis ed., 2009).
164. See CHONG, supra note 105, at 86–90. Indirect investment does not
directly contribute to development as it is merely money held within a
corporation which can be retained, distributed, or otherwise disposed of
without improving infrastructure.
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acknowledged that the laxity of domestic Chinese accounting
165
standards makes the purchase of Chinese stock risky. To
meet the high standard of U.S. IPO requirements, many
166
Chinese companies simply submit fabricated information.
While the CSRC has attempted to develop a stronger disclosure
regime in the hope of creating a less deceptive market, its
167
attempts have remained largely unsuccessful.
Despite
membership in IOSCO and IASC, China’s accounting
168
standards still lag behind most Western economies.
Third, the threshold test for mandatory review under
merger law is the existence of a major factor that may seriously
affect market competition. Without a history of interpretation
of the “major factor” threshold, it is unlikely that reverse
merger review would occur. Fourth, without the Chinese
company disclosing that it will be entering into a CRM, there is
little reason to assume a relevant authority would be aware of
the transaction in order to notify the Ministry of Commerce
169
(“MOFCOM”).
A number of provisions of Chinese law could ensure review
of CRM company reports on financial and operations
170
information prior to review by U.S. auditors. They appear to
have been little used at this point. If Chinese auditors had
carefully reviewed the information submitted by Sino-Forest
Corporation as an introductory step to a CRM, it is very likely
that Sino-Forest would never have entered a public market.
Even so, it is unlikely that the United States will be able to rely
on the integrity of the Chinese auditors until the “soft law”
from IOSCO or China’s membership in IASC starts to show
marked implementation into China’s systems. In the
165. See Tan Wentao, China’s Stock Market, in CHINA’S FINANCIAL
MARKETS 209 (Salih N. Neftci & Michelle Yuan Ménager-Xu eds., 2007)
(claiming the accounting system inadequately protects investors).
166. See FU, supra note 68, at 209 (finding that many companies forge
profit information in order to obtain IPO approval).
167. See id. at 201. Chinese shareholders have a culture of relying on
sources outside company disclosures to determine share health. Shareholders
tend to not rely on disclosures because they are frequently false. See id.
(describing that many investors based knowledge from friends and relatives).
Further, without the rule of law enforcement is more difficult and many
corporate officers simply continue to provide false information to meet
disclosure requirements. See id. at 209.
168. See id. at 205 (discussing the lax standards of Chinese investment
regulation).
169. See id. (stating that the threshold test for mandatory review was
meant to be a low standard so as to catch as much as possible).
170. See generally id. at 201–02 (discussing the Securities Law of 1998 and
CRSC crackdown as examples of China’s actions on securities regulation).
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meantime, it is worth considering hard law options between the
two countries, to be discussed infra.
C. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW IS INSUFFICIENT TO
ADDRESS THE CRM PROBLEM
International organizations have prompted the WTO to
consider an international investment law, as many countries
171
have developed their own laws on cross-border investment.
As discussed, supra, bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) are
common tools for this area, but lack the scope to adequately
172
address the problem. Generally BITs only apply to FDI.
Seeing as this is not the type of investment involved in a
reverse merger, a BIT would largely be unhelpful. A
multilateral agreement on investment (“MAI”), however, is
broad enough to encompass the accounting and disclosure
173
issues of a reverse merger. While an MAI is the most suitable
treaty-based solution, in practice investment policy is very
politically sensitive and thus an MAI is not likely to be adopted
174
by the WTO.
1. BITs Cannot Address Reverse Merger Indirect Investment
Issues
The purpose of a BIT is to attract FDI between the
175
contracting countries.
China, currently focused on
176
encouraging FDI in certain industries, not FII, has identified
three main goals of a BIT: (1) facilitate and attract investment;
(2) contribute to the prosperity of both contracting states; and
177
(3) cooperate on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.
BITs may appear to have a purpose broad enough to target
the accounting and auditing problems arising from private
Chinese companies, but so far none have emerged. A BIT
proposed by the United States to China to protect international
investors from fraud perpetuated by Chinese companies
through inadequate disclosure enforcement and accounting
171. See generally Peter Holmes, Trade & Competition Policy: At the WTO
Issues for Developing Countries (Ctr. on Regulation and Competition, 2003)
(discussing barriers to a WTO competition law and the issues any such law
should consider).
172. See GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 163, at 49.
173. See HUIPING, supra note 129, at 7.
174. See id. at 8–12 (chronicling the history of attempts to negotiate an
MAI).
175. See GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 163.
176. Reverse mergers are a type of FII.
177. See GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 163.
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standards is not likely to enter serious negotiations. If a
treaty were to be agreed upon, the additional problem of
enforcement remains.
BITs are interpreted narrowly and are not currently used
179
in China to target indirect investment.
Typically, the
investing party is able to impose obligations on China through
this process in exchange for investments to help the
180
development of the Chinese economy and infrastructure.
While the purpose of a BIT is usually to reassure the investor
181
that its investments are being used accordingly, this does not
mean that a BIT between China and the United States could
not cover indirect investment. But problems would arise in the
interpretation of indirect investment as there is almost no
182
mention of it in other BITs, making the definition ethereal. If
a breach of the agreement did occur, which is likely given the
distinct political goals of China and the United States,
183
arbitration is not likely to provide a satisfying solution.
With 126 BITs, China has one of the most extensive treaty
184
networks to protect international investments. Surprisingly,
185
it has not entered into an agreement with the United States.
China and the United States entered BIT negotiations in 1983,
but each country had very different issues it wanted to address;
186
thus frustrating and eventually ending the negotiations. If
the United States were to propose an agreement containing
sufficient regulations on accounting and disclosure issues,
187
China would be unlikely to negotiate seriously. While such
reform would be vital to China’s growth in FII and the
188
development of the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets,
178. See HUIPING, supra note 129, at 6–7.
179. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 129, at 1–2.
180. See id. at 108.
181. See id. at 1–2.
182. See id. at 139.
183. See generally Duncan Hollis, What Will A U.S.-China BIT Do To
Investor-State
Arbitrations,
OPINIO
JURIS
(Mar.
22,
2010),
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/03/22/what-will-a-us-china-bit-do-to-investor-statearbitrations/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (discussing the challenges posed in
developing a BIT that will soothe both countries’ regulatory fears).
184. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 129, at 31.
185. See id. at 32.
186. Disagreement over the national treatment standard of the treaty was
the primary stumbling block. See id. at 33.
187. See id. (arguing that the “highly prescriptive formula” embraced by
the United States will make it difficult to negotiate a BIT).
188. See id. at 8 (claiming that China modified many laws in order to
attract more FDI and national investors).
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China prefers to focus on attracting FDI. Additionally, it seems
unlikely that the United States would be able to assert
sufficient pressure on MOFCOM to motivate it to propose a
189
treaty to the State Council that would require Chinese audits
and corporate disclosures to meet the standard required in the
United States.
2. An MAI Is Not A Practical Solution
While an MAI could properly address the issues raised by
indirect investment and minimum accounting standard
requirements, the recent history of failed attempts suggests
190
that the WTO is not currently able to address this issue. In
1995, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (“OECD”), of which China is not a member,
191
initiated negotiations to form an MAI. A report by the OECD
on the purpose of MAIs states that:
A multilateral agreement on investment would
provide a strong and comprehensive framework for
international investment and would strengthen the
multilateral trading regime.
It would set clear,
consistent and transparent rules on liberalization and
192
investor protection . . . .
When negotiations in the OECD stagnated and failed, the
OECD proposed that the WTO be the body to form such an
193
agreement. The WTO did not foreclose forming a treaty on
international investments and a working group was created to
194
look at the relationship between trade and investment. While
developed countries were not able to get an investment treaty
on the Doha Round agenda, there remains a possibility that
there will be a WTO treaty on the issue in the future, despite
189. See id. at 33–34 (discussing the process in which the MOFCOM
applies to the State Council for negotiation of a treaty).
190. See generally HUIPING, supra note 129, at 1 (discussing the multiple
attempts of the WTO to create an MAI).
191. See id. For a list of OECD member countries see List of OECD
Member Countries–Ratification of Convention on the OECD, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,0
0.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
192. OECD, Rep. by the Comm. on Int’l Inv. and Multinational Enters.
(CIME) and the Comm. on Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions
(CMIT), A Multilateral Agreement on Investment, DAFFE/CMIT/CIME
(95)13/Final, 5 May 1995, 1.
193. See HUIPING, supra note 129, at 1.
194. See id. The WTO formed a Working Group in 1996 following the
Ministerial Conference in Singapore to create rules for multilateral
investment treaties.
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195

unsuccessful past attempts.
However, the likelihood and
196
nearness of such a development is dubious.
A more
immediate solution is needed to prevent fraud in the U.S.
market from private Chinese companies.
The WTO had previously enacted TRIMs, which is covered
197
by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”). The DSU
provides a mandatory forum for dispute resolution among
198
member countries, such as China and the United States.
However, TRIMs does not specifically cover issues raised by
199
reverse mergers. TRIMs, introduced at the Uruguay Round,
deals with the concept of regulating foreign investment as part
200
of international trade. While TRIMs deals with investment, it
is not directly applicable to ensuring Chinese audits and
201
disclosures meet U.S. standards for indirect investment.
TRIMs requires compliance with GATT, particularly the
principle of national treatment under Article III:4 on internal
202
regulations. This principle requires that China not impose
203
domestic regulations that treat other countries less favorably.
There is no evidence that China treats U.S. investments
different from others, nor is there evidence that accountants,
auditors, or corporate directors provide different information to
U.S.–listed Chinese companies than they do to Chinese
companies in other countries. It therefore appears that the
TRIMs agreement is not applicable as a mechanism for
enhancing China’s accounting and disclosure standards.
An MAI would establish an investment code to protect the
interests of all parties in an investment transaction. However,
as was the case with a BIT, the primary purpose of an MAI is

195. See id.; see also SURYA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
52 (2008) (finding that while this topic was on the WTO agenda for discussion,
it was abandoned it in 2004).
196. See HUIPING, supra note 129, at 1 (discussing that there remains only
some chance that formal negotiations will be held on investment rules in the
WTO).
WTO,
Legal
Texts:
The
WTO
Agreements,
197. See
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#Understanding (last
visited Feb. 13, 2012) (describing the DSU and TRIMS).
198. See id.
199. See SUBEDI, supra note 195, at 37 (showing TRIMS does not mention
reverse mergers in the article text dealing with foreign investment).
200. See id.
201. See id. (arguing that TRIMS was applicable only to international
instruments such as the GATT).
202. See id.
203. See id.
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204

the regulation of FDI. As China is one of the world’s largest
FDI recipients, such an agreement would have a direct effect
205
upon investment to and from China. MAIs, though, could also
encompass broad issues as well, including indirect investment,
making this a more relevant solution than a BIT; as described
by the OECD, the goal of an MAI is to “set high standards for
206
the treatment and protection of investment.”
Critics have complained that this type of agreement is a
207
Bill of Rights for foreign investors. However, if the purpose is
to promote growth and development it is more than reasonable
to accord investors, whose money makes possible that growth
and development, certain internationally agreed-upon rights.
The protection of investment and aim to liberalize trade seem
to go hand-in-hand with a need to create a solid foundation in
accounting, auditing, corporate disclosure, and enforcement
regimes. While reverse mergers are primarily a problem
between China and the United States, other forms of
investment could benefit from being able to rely on information
provided to Chinese stock markets. Meeting U.S. standards
would help ensure that more accurate information reaches
investors and that the stock market reflects the actual
performance of the listed companies.
An MAI negotiated and agreed upon as a multilateral
agreement within the WTO could subsequently be added to the
covered agreements within the WTO DSU. This would provide
all parties with a mandatory venue for dispute settlement and
interpretation of terms within the agreement. The DSU does
not follow a stare decisis tradition, but instead has
208
accumulated legislation.
This legislation provides parties
with guidance on how to draft and interpret agreements in an
attempt to avoid future arbitration. The presence of a dispute
settlement body could have the effect of increasing compliance
with the MAI. While a non-WTO based MAI is possible, it is not
preferable to the standardized enforcement and dispute
resolution tools of the WTO.
204. See SUBEDI, supra note 195, at 40.
205. See GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 163, at 2 n.2 (finding that China
attracted a record $53 billion in FDI).
206. See SUBEDI, supra note 195, at 40 (citing OECD Rep. by the Comm. on
Int’l Inv. and Multinational Enters. (CIME) and the Comm. on Capital
Movements and Invisible Transactions (CMIT), A Multilateral Agreement on
Investment, DAFFE/CMIT/CIME (95)13/Final, 5 May 1995, 1).
207. Critics claimed the MAI gave no thought to the social obligations of
investors. See id. at 41.
208. See WTO, supra note 197, (describing how the DSU settles claims).
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While an MAI might offer a potential solution to the
problems posed by CRMs, the political appetite for such
measures is lacking among WTO members. The Doha Round
abandoned negotiations on foreign investment as it found the
209
topic to be too complex for the WTO to accommodate. With
the wide variety of interests of member countries they were not
able to even come to an agreement on the meaning of the term
210
“foreign direct investment.”
Some members are so
disillusioned by the prior failed negotiations on the matter that
211
many are reluctant to consider anything similar. It therefore
appears that an MAI through the WTO is not a realistic
mechanism for enhancing China’s standards of accounting or
corporate disclosures.
III. THE CRM PROBLEM IS BEST ADDRESSED THROUGH
A PLURILATERAL AGREEMENT
China is not likely to unilaterally increase enforcement of
auditing and accounting standards without hard law
pressuring or incentivizing enforcement. China’s recent
enactment of antitrust laws provides a basis for using
competition law to review cross-border transactions, such as
212
reverse mergers.
Instead of a BIT, an MAI, or a TRIMs solution, discussed
supra, the United States should pursue a plurilateral
agreement through the WTO. This agreement would focus on
macro issues of international competition law. In the
background of a macro competition law, China and the United
States could then engage in a bilateral agreement on the micro
issues, including auditing and accounting standards. Through
this approach, the risks of reverse mergers would be addressed.

209. See SUBEDI, supra note 195, at 154; see also Magnus Feldmann, The
Association Agreement between the European Union and Poland, in
REGIONALISM, MULTILATERALISM, AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, supra note
130, at 51–52 (describing the process of establishing multilateral rules on
foreign investment as “complex and tortuous”).
210. See SUBEDI, supra note 195, at 154 (finding that WTO member states
could not agree what an international treaty on FDI would cover).
211. See Joakim Reiter, The EU–Mexico Free Trade Agreement: Assessing
the EU Approach to Regulatory Issues, in REGIONALISM, MULTILATERALISM,
AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, supra note 130, at 94.
212. See HERBERT SMITH, Chinese Antitrust Law Enacted at Last, (Aug. 30,
2007),
http://www.herbertsmith.com/NR/rdonlyres/6E845328-5888-4D0B8DEF-FFA0C7C1EE56/4545/ChineseAntitrustLawenactedatlast.htm
(last
visited Feb. 13, 2012) (calling the newly enacted legislation “comprehensive in
scope”).

376

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol 21:2

A. CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAWS PROVIDE FRAMEWORK FOR
IMPROVING ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
In 2008, China introduced antitrust laws after fourteen
213
years of legislative drafting. The Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”)
encompasses a prohibition on monopolistic agreements,
214
exploitive behavior, and government restraint of competition.
215
Crucially, the AML provides for merger review. The existence
of the AML is meant to encourage practitioners to consider the
216
implications of merger or reverse merger transactions. Such a
review, focused on assessing the “effect of elimination or
217
restricting competition,”
would require consideration of a
company’s market power. In order to adequately consider a
company’s market power, it stands to reason that regulators
must be privy to correct and complete financial and operational
information. The AML requires companies considering a
merger to file audited financial and accounting reports from the
218
past year. Once filed, MOFCOM can take up to thirty days to
review and submit a notification of approval or require further
219
investigation, delaying the transaction by up to ninety days.
This domestic backdrop is well suited to the applicability of
an international competition law. AML is based on many of the
same principles enshrined in competition law generally.
Inculcating strong accounting standards for domestic mergers
is likely to have a spillover effect on cross-border transactions,
of which mergers are a part, necessarily implicating
220
competition law.
B. A PLURILATERAL AGREEMENT IS THE BEST FRAMEWORK FOR
213. See NEE & TAO, supra note 9, at 324. The competition laws are
modeled after EU and U.S. competition laws.
214. See id. at 325.
215. See id.
216. See id. (demonstrating that the AML requires practitioners to consider
possible sanctions, market restrictions, and prior approval rules when
merging).
217. See id. at 339 (citing The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic
of China, Art. 28 (adopted at the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee of
the Tenth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, Aug.
30,
2007,
effective
Aug.
1,
2008),
translation
available
at
http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2009-02/10/content_17254169.htm)).
218. Additionally, companies must file a notification of merger, a statement
explaining the impact of the merger on competition, and the concentration
agreement. See id. at 337.
219. See id. at 338.
220. See TAYLOR, supra note 99, at 36 (discussing the rise of cross-border
mergers as a part competition law).
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ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW
The United States, China, and other WTO members have
the ability to draft and enforce a comprehensive competition
law within WTO forums. This is an imperfect, yet novel,
approach to solving the accounting and disclosure issues
highlighted by the current CRM litigation. Competition law is
capable of filling the gap presented by the U.S. and Chinese
securities laws and enforcement issues. Investment regulations
can be seen as an integral part of competition law. The
differences in financial standards between the United States
and China leave international investors vulnerable with almost
no protections. While investment regulation in China is a very
politically sensitive area and a proposed agreement between
China and the United States is not likely to be well received,
competition law provides a usable platform for further
regulations. China has recognized that there is benefit to be
221
derived from competition law and the WTO presents the most
logical enforcement body.
The WTO would provide an ideal system for dispute
resolution, helping to drive compliance and enforcement of the
treaty. With enforcement as one of the current problems,
adoption of such a voluntary plurilateral agreement by the
WTO would provide injured parties of member countries with
procedures to obtain compensation for damage caused by
fraudulent information.
The plurilateral status of the agreement would ensure that
countries could enter the treaty voluntarily. China and the
United States may be able to find common ground in
competition law. The agreement could be drafted to require
enforcement of related micro issues between signing parties in
a bilateral agreement to be enforceable within the plurilateral
agreement.
While Chinese and American competition laws appear to
222
be converging,
the recent surge of litigation surrounding
CRMs suggests that something more needs to be done in the
interim to ensure proper financial disclosures are made and
that auditing standards are followed. Plurilateral and bilateral
agreements on international competition laws could address
issues in both China and the United States in furtherance of
221. See id. at 91–92 (discussing competition laws China has enacted to
prohibit firms of a specific market threshold from engaging in certain
conduct).
222. See id. at 90–91 (showing that U.S. and Chinese competition laws are
both being developed around the same behavioral thresholds).
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each country’s own political and economic agendas.
Rather than focusing directly on FDI and FII in MAIs,
promoting regulation that would affect CRMs through
international competition law stands a better chance of
approval by WTO members. The plurilateral agreement would
generally mirror the current AML within China and the
bilateral agreement would focus solely on the accounting
review required of internationally merging companies. This
agreement, therefore, would be minimally intrusive into
China’s regulatory authority. There is already economic and
political support for the creation of international competition
law, as such a law “would be welfare enhancing relative to a
situation in which each nation enforces its competition laws on
an extraterritorial basis in accordance with its national self223
interest.” WTO members are likely to reach an agreement on
the macro issues of competition policy, leaving the micro issues
to be resolved by individual countries.
Different countries’ competition laws tend to be similar in
224
substance and procedure.
Within Asia, however, not all
members of a regional trade association, namely the Asia
Pacific Economic Co-operation (“APEC”), have competition
225
laws,
and those that do seem to function in a distinct
226
manner. This regional issue represents an even larger issue.
If all WTO members are expected to agree on an international
competition law, which requires a consensus, the law will
inevitably be general in nature. It will not necessarily address
Chinese accounting and corporate disclosure issues, but it may
indirectly require that the existing structure and agencies in
China start complying with defined competition obligations.
The issues of accounting and corporate disclosure
standards are likely to be categorized as micro issues in the
227
drafting of an international competition law. Each country is
likely to have very different ideas of what the micro issues are
and countries will have divergent interests in micro issues
based on their market conditions. It would be impractical, and
inappropriate, for an international competition policy to
223. See id. at 69.
224. See id. at 75 (describing the rise of competition of laws as based on
common notions such as fairness and well-accepted economic principles).
225. See id. (noting only some nations have adopted competition laws).
226. See TAYLOR, supra note 99, at 76 (arguing that competition laws are
tailored to each country’s culture and thus remain “nationally distinctive”).
227. See id. at 79 (defining micro issues as those that regulate institutional
influences and market definitions).
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prescribe certain regulations within each country with the aim
of unifying competition laws.
WTO members have the option of creating a broad
competition law that would outline specific macro issues. Most
countries believe that competition law should have the primary
objective of encouraging competition, in the hope of increasing
228
economic efficiency.
There is evidence that countries are
likely to be able to come to a consensus on the key macro
issues: merger laws, anti-monopoly laws, and concerted conduct
229
laws. Afterwards, a bilateral agreement between the United
States and China should be developed, building on China’s new
competition laws and WTO-created international competition
laws, which enforces U.S. accounting requirements and
Chinese merger review. Such an agreement would cover the
micro issues discussed supra.
The United States, along with other countries, embraces
230
the extraterritoriality of competition law.
Specifically the
United States recognizes the “effects doctrine” in competition
law which allows U.S. antitrust laws to extend beyond U.S.
jurisdiction if the transaction has a “material effect” on U.S.
231
commerce. This doctrine, and its counterpart laws of other
countries, may indicate a growing trend towards recognizing
the international effects of transactions occurring beyond a
country’s control and the growing need for an international
competition law. As discussed above, though, it is necessary to
make sure that such jurisdiction is enforceable, and this would
only be possible with a bilateral agreement.
Any bilateral agreement between the United States and
China regarding competition law must have proper
enforcement mechanisms. The agreement should demonstrate
a preference for case initiation by domestic agencies. For an
agency to be an enforcer it must have access to detailed
232
information about the companies. U.S. enforcement agencies,
such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of
233
Justice, could be granted access to the internal records of
228. See id. at 77. This goal was identified by the World Bank and OECD.
229. See id. at 78–79 (finding these principles to be a key structure in all
APEC competition laws).
230. See id. at 64–65. The laws are relatively new and limited.
231. See Edward M. Graham, Approaches to Competition Theory, in TRADE
RULES IN THE MAKING 438 (Miguel Rodriquez Mendoza, Patrick Low &
Barbara Kotschwar eds., 1999).
232. These enforcement duties grant such agencies broad discovery powers.
See id. at 436.
233. See U.S. Dep't of Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1
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firms and could apply penalties to firms who do not keep proper
records. Currently in horizontal mergers, the Federal Trade
Commission or Department of Justice reviews the market
share of the merging companies to ensure they do not create an
234
overly concentrated market.
While the only challenged
mergers are those that pose a threat of concentration, it is the
initial review of market share that requires preparation of
records and reports relevant to reverse merger review.
235
China has similar agencies in place with similar powers.
A bilateral agreement could require that these Chinese
agencies perform a thorough review of all companies engaging
in a merger, which is currently required by law within China,
as well as a review of all CRMs. Upon review of a CRM, the
Chinese agency could send a report to the SEC on its overall
impression of the firm given its financial and operational
information. The SEC could then align the certification with
the Form 8-K that CRMs must file after completing the
transaction. A firm that failed to disclose its intention to merge
to the relevant Chinese authority would not have a certification
on file with the SEC, prompting the SEC to inform the Chinese
agency which could then either require compliance or apply a
penalty against the firm. In the meantime, the SEC and the
exchanges could prevent the CRM from being listed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Within the United States, CRMs pose an unreasonable risk
to investors who rely on information disclosed to regulators
when deciding where to put their money. Chinese companies
have exploited lax auditors and minimal regulatory oversight
to gain access to U.S. markets using fraudulent financial data.
The SEC has attempted measures at increasing disclosure
requirements to combat this risk, but has failed to address the
underlying problem of a lack of compliance with auditing,
accounting, and disclosure requirements of companies within
China. In China, CRMs represent a form of investment that is
discouraged in favor of FDI, meaning there is no vested
government interest in ensuring CRMs remain a convenient
form of investment.
The optimal solution is not an outright ban on the reverse
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf.
234. See id. at 4–5 (describing the process in which market share is
calculated to determine if a merger is appropriate).
235. See CHONG, supra note 105, at 99 (describing China’s new merger
control regime, but which only applies to foreign mergers).
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merger transaction, as it does provide legitimate benefits to
certain companies, but rather the formation of a plurilateral
international competition law within the WTO. To more
specifically address the CRM problem, this agreement should
be immediately followed by a bilateral agreement between the
United States and China. The international competition law
could provide an international framework for the review of
international merger transactions, while the bilateral
agreement could address the specific procedures for ensuring
Chinese companies are audited properly within China prior to
entering U.S. markets.

